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Abstract—Capability machines such as CHERI provide mem-
ory capabilities that can be used by compilers to provide security
benefits for compiled code (e.g., memory safety). The existing
C to CHERI compiler, for example, achieves memory safety
by following a principle called “pointers as capabilities” (PAC ).
Informally, PAC says that a compiler should represent a source
language pointer as a machine code capability. But the security
properties of PAC compilers are not yet well understood. We
show that memory safety is only one aspect, and that PAC com-
pilers can provide significant additional security guarantees for
partial programs: the compiler can provide security guarantees
for a compilation unit, even if that compilation unit is later linked
to attacker-provided machine code.
As such, this paper is the first to study the security of PAC
compilers for partial programs formally. We prove for a model
of such a compiler that it is fully abstract. The proof uses a novel
proof technique (dubbed TrICL, read trickle), which should be
of broad interest because it reuses the whole-program compiler
correctness relation for full abstraction, thus saving work. We
also implement our scheme for C on CHERI , show that we can
compile legacy C code with minimal changes, and show that the
performance overhead of compiled code is roughly proportional
to the number of cross-compilation-unit function calls.
Index Terms—Capability machines, full abstraction, secure
compilation
I. INTRODUCTION
In a conventional computer, memory is addressed using
integers (pointers). In a capability machine, memory is ad-
dressed using capabilities [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7], which carry
more information than just a memory address—they also
contain bounds information, indicating a range of memory
that can be accessed using the capability, and possibly also
other information such as access permissions. Load and store
instructions take a capability (in a register), and the machine
checks that the memory accessed is within the capability’s
bounds and that the operation is compliant with the capability’s
permissions. If not, the instruction fails with an exception. The
hardware also ensures that integers and capabilities are not
confused. One way of ensuring this is by tracking capabilities
in memory and in registers by tagging memory locations and
registers that contain capabilities. Hence, capability machines
implement a more structured memory model where (somewhat
simplified) memory is a collection of independent integer-
indexed arrays containing integers or capabilities, and every
capability gives access to a contiguous segment of one of
those arrays. This more structured memory model can be used
to implement fine-grained memory protection, and has the
potential to provide protection against many software bugs.
A recent capability machine is CHERI [4]. It has its own
FreeBSD version and C compiler [8, 4, 9, 10, 11]. Many key
design choices in CHERI were made to facilitate the use of
memory protection in existing, large code bases. Specifically,
CHERI supports the pointers-as-capabilities (PAC ) principle,
which intuitively dictates that a compiler should represent
a source-level pointer as a target-level capability. To make
this convenient, a CHERI capability contains (among other
things) base and length addresses, and an offset relative
to the base address [11]. Such a capability represents a pointer
pointing to the address base+offset, and that is valid only if
(base+offset) ∈ [base, base+length). Pointer arithmetic
can be implemented by manipulating the offset. The following
example illustrates how a compiler can map C pointers to such
machine-level capabilities.1
1 extern void send_rcv(char∗ buffer);
2 static char iobuffer [512];
3 static int secret;
4
5 void f() {
6 iobuffer[42] = ’X’;
7 send_rcv(iobuffer);
8 }
1 csl $c1, $ddc, 512;
2 li $r1, ’X’;
3 csw $r1, 42($c1);
4 call send_rcv;
The C compilation unit (top) declares two module-scoped
variables and defines a function f() using one of these vari-
ables. The assembly pseudocode (bottom) shows how a PAC
compiler could translate the body of f(). The default data
capability register $ddc contains a capability for the global
data section. The compiler knows that the variable iobuffer
occupies the first 512 bytes of that global data section.
Hence, the first instruction (csl, set length of a capability)
loads in register $c1 a copy of $ddc but with the length
field reduced to 512. The next two instructions implement
the assignment instruction of f(). Note that an out-of-bounds
access would be trapped by the hardware. The final call
instruction implements the function call in f() (assuming a
1 As a typesetting convention, we use a blue, sans-serif font for source
language elements and an orange, bold font for target language ones.
Elements common to both languages are typeset in a black , italic font.
calling convention where the argument is passed in register
$c1). All accesses to iobuffer performed in send_rcv will be
bounds-checked, since the capability passed to send_rcv carries
the bounds information.
Which security benefits does such a PAC compiler provide?
First, the compiler provides spatial memory safety. Since the
bounds meta-data for a pointer is stored together with the
pointer address in a single capability value, it is natural to
implement a bounds-checking compiler [12, Section 4.3]. For
instance, an out-of-bounds access to iobuffer in our example
will not access the secret variable, but just fail.2
However, this is not the full story regarding security proper-
ties. Consider the example again under the assumption that the
external send_rcv function is implemented directly in assembly.
Now, we lose the guarantee that send_rcv cannot access the
secret variable because an assembly level implementation can
directly access $ddc. Hence, upfront, memory safety is only
guaranteed for complete programs: if all code in a program
is compiled by the PAC compiler, then all out-of-bounds
accesses will be trapped.
Nonetheless, a PAC compiler can provide a security guar-
antee even for partial programs by relying on capability
unforgeability [19] and on a trusted control stack (that hides
the capability of a program part from the context). The main
contribution of this paper is to prove that a PAC compiler can,
in fact, provide strong security guarantees for partial programs.
For our example, the compiler we model in this paper provides
the guarantee that secret is inaccessible, even if the function
send_rcv is implemented in hand-crafted assembly.
To achieve non-trivial security guarantees for partial pro-
grams, the target capability machine needs to support a
mechanism to define separate protection domains within a
single process. For instance, CHERI provides support for so-
called object capabilities [10, 9]. This makes it possible to
put different program parts in separate protection domains.
CHERI mainly uses object capabilities to compartmentalize
programs: it offers an API to programmers to run parts of
a program in a sandbox, a protection domain with reduced
privileges. The current CHERI compiler, however, does not
make direct use of the object capability mechanism: it can
only be used through the provided API by the programmer
who has to define and set up sandboxes manually. The PAC
compiler we propose in this paper automatically sets up a
separate protection domain for every compilation unit. Doing
so allows the compiler to provide strong security guarantees
for partial programs.
Summary of our results: We study the security guarantees
that a PAC compiler can provide for partial programs.
Our setting is a PAC compiler from a simple imperative
source language with pointers to a capability machine with
memory capabilities and a very basic form of protection
2In principle, it is also possible to have the compiler provide temporal
memory safety, but this is harder as it requires zeroing out all capabilities to
a memory region when the region is freed. Efficient temporal memory safety
for C is still an open problem and out of scope here. We refer the interested
reader to prior work [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18].
domains/object capabilities. Our overarching contribution is
a very strong security theorem for this compiler, namely, full
abstraction (FA) [20, 21], which intuitively means that the
compilation preserves and reflects observational equivalence of
partial programs. FA implies the preservation of many security
properties like data confidentiality, even when target contexts
are arbitrary target code (in our case, arbitrary assembly code)
that may not respect the compiler’s conventions.
In proving FA for PAC , we make two additional contribu-
tions. Our first contribution is a new trace-based proof tech-
nique for FA that can simultaneously handle dynamic memory
sharing between modules and, importantly, reuses whole-
program compiler correctness as a black-box to simplify
the FA proof. FA proofs with dynamic memory sharing are
difficult and (whole-program) compiler correctness is usually
proved anyhow, so reusing it for proving FA reduces work.
Technically, our proof is structured as a new 3-way simulation
called TrICL (read “trickle”). We expect TrICL to be of
interest beyond our PAC setting.
Second, to prove FA, we find it essential to reflect some
structure of capabilities at the source-code level, forcing the
programmer to take into account some of the machine-code-
level expressiveness when reasoning about the source program.
Interestingly, not doing this may also lead to subtle security
vulnerabilities as the following example illustrates.
1 static bool secret=true;
2
3 int branch_on_secret(int∗ p, int∗ q) {
4 if ((int) p ! = (int) q) return 0;
5 if (secret) return p[1]; else return q[1];
6 }
Function branch_on_secret() first tests whether its two ar-
gument pointers are equal addresses. This equality implies
that the dereference operations p[1] and q[1] both evaluate to
the same value (or both fail). Hence, branch_on_secret() is not
really meant to leak any information about secret. However, a
machine-code level adversary can call branch_on_secret() with
two capabilities that both point to the same address but that
have different bounds information. In that case, accessing p[1]
could fail, while accessing q[1] could succeed and return a
value. Thus, the behavior of branch_on_secret() in that case
does leak information about secret. More dangerously, it
leaks this information in a way to which the source-level
programmer is oblivious. The source-level programmer does
not have a way to access bounds information through pointer
operations, while this bounds information actually opens up
an information channel. Hence, to prove our FA result (which
includes the preservation of source-level contextual equiva-
lence), we extend the source language to make pointers carry
bounds information. This essentially makes explicit exactly
what aspects of the target language programmers need to take
into account to reason about the security of partial source
programs.
A second property we require for FA is that machine code
does not have direct access to the program counter capability.
This is easily checked at link time. It guarantees that the target
context cannot confuse a partial program by providing it a code
capability where it expects a data capability (a behavior that
does not exist in our source language).
Finally, as our last contribution, we implement our com-
piler for C by adding a “compartmentalizing compiler-pass”
on top of the existing C-to-CHERI compiler (the non-
compartmentalizing PAC compiler) [10, 12], and we evaluate
the performance cost as well as the compatibility of the
compartmentalizing PAC compiler with existing code.
Contributions summary: To summarize, we make the
following contributions:
• We state and prove the security properties of a pointers-as-
capabilities (PAC ) compiler for partial programs for the first
time. In doing so, we make several technical contributions:
− the definition of a sound and complete trace semantics
for a C-like language (Section III-A) and for a language
with capabilities (Section III-B). Both languages feature a
memory model that allows fine-grained dynamic memory
sharing;
− the definition of a compiler between the aforementioned
languages that embodies the PAC principle (Section IV);
− a proof that the said compiler is fully abstract, with a
new trace-based technique, TrICL, that handles dynamic
memory sharing and allows reuse of whole-program com-
piler correctness for FA (Section V);
• An implementation of our compiler on top of the existing
C-to-CHERI compiler and a measurement of its efficiency
and compatibility with existing C code (Sections VI and VII).
We have simplified some aspects of the technical work for
presentation. The full details as well as proofs are provided in a
technical report (TR), available in a public repository [22]. The
implementation of our compiler and the related benchmarks
are also available in the same repository.
II. FULL ABSTRACTION AND A NEW PROOF TECHNIQUE
We briefly recap compiler full abstraction (FA), outline at a
high-level how it is proved, explain why a new proof technique
is needed and what our new technique (TrICL) does.
A. Preliminaries
Given execution states s, s′ of a language, and a small-step
reduction relation → (with a reflexive transitive closure →∗),
we denote by s → s′ the judgment that state s executes and
transitions into state s′. We call a state stuck if there is no s′
such that s → s′. We treat exceptions and silent divergence
the same way we treat stuck states, so, with slight abuse of
terminology, we use the term diverging for executions that get
stuck, silently reduce forever or end in exceptions.
Programs, initial & terminal states: In our simple imper-
ative setting, a (partial) program is a list of modules, and a
module is a list of functions. A program is called whole if its
functions refer only to other functions also defined within the
program. Otherwise, it is called partial. Linking of a pair of
programs is denoted n. We define linking noncommutatively
because this simplifies some technicalities (see the TR for
details). For the sake of exposition, we distinguish two parts
C and p of a linked program Cn p as the context and the
program, suggesting that the latter is the program part of
interest because it is the program that is translated by our
compiler. Note that each of C and p may themselves consist
of more than one module (i.e., more than one compilation
unit). As usual, only whole programs with a main entry-point
function can execute. We also use the standard notation C[p]
for Cn p.
The initial state of a program p is denoted init(p). A state s
is called terminal when it satisfies a special judgment `t s. If
the execution of a program of interest p in a certain context C
reaches a terminal state, then we say the execution converges
(or, that the program converges). We denote convergence by
C [p] ⇓, which is shorthand for ∃s. init(C[p])→∗ s ∧ `t s.
Next, we define contextual equivalence of (partial) programs.
Definition 1 (Contextual equivalence).
p1'ctx p2
def
= ∀C. C [p1] ⇓ ⇐⇒ C [p2] ⇓
B. Compiler full abstraction
A compiler J·K is fully abstract when it preserves and reflects
contextual equivalence. The use of full abstraction to establish
compiler security is standard [20, 23, 21].
Definition 2 (Full abstraction). The compiler J·K is FA if for
all ps1, ps2:
(i) (Reflection) Jps1K 'ctx Jps2K =⇒ ps1 'ctx ps2
(ii) (Preservation) Jps1K 'ctx Jps2K ⇐= ps1 'ctx ps2
Condition (i) ensures that the compiler is non-trivial (a
trivial compiler might compile semantically different programs
to the same output program, which is forbidden by reflection).
Reflection usually follows immediately from backward sim-
ulation, the standard formalization of the compiler’s whole-
program correctness [24, 25].
Condition (ii) is the “security-relevant” direction of FA as
it ensures that no extra distinguishing power is gained by
target contexts as compared to source contexts. It implies the
preservation of any security property that can be formalized as
program equivalence (a notable example being noninterference
for confidentiality). It is usually proved in the contrapositive:
Assume Jps1K 6'ctx Jps2K, and show ps1 6'ctx ps2. From the
assumption, there must be a target context that distinguishes
Jps1K and Jps2K (causes one to diverge and the other to
converge). From this, we need to construct a source context
that distinguishes ps1 and ps2. This construction of the source
context is called back-translation in the literature. There
are two broad approaches to back-translation: syntax-directed
and trace-directed [21]. Here, we follow the trace-directed
approach as we find it technically more convenient (we discuss
syntax-directed approaches in Section VIII).
The key idea of the trace-directed approach is to character-
ize the observable behavior of partial programs via a labeled
transition system that produces (finite) traces describing how
a partial program interacts with its environment.3 This is
3For the purpose of proving FA, finite traces suffice, so “trace” in this
paper always refers to a finite trace.
done separately for source and target languages. We denote
the set of traces of a partial program p by Tr(p). Next,
define trace equivalence T= of partial programs in source
and target languages separately: Two partial programs (both
source or both target) p1, p2 are trace equivalent, p1
T
= p2, if
Tr(p1) = Tr(p2). We then prove three lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Soundness of target trace equivalence).
Jps1K 6'ctx Jps2K =⇒ Jps1K
T
6= Jps2K
Lemma 2 (Compilation preserves trace equivalence).
Jps1K
T
6= Jps2K =⇒ ps1
T
6= ps2
Lemma 3 (Completeness of source trace-equivalence).
ps1
T
6= ps2 =⇒ ps1 6'ctx ps2
The composition of these three lemmas immediately yields
our goal, the contrapositive of condition (ii)! The important
point is that only Lemma 2 bridges the two languages4.
Lemma 2 follows immediately from the following two lem-
mas, which together say that the compiler preserves and
reflects traces of partial programs.
Lemma 4 (No trace is omitted by compilation). α ∈
Tr(ps) =⇒ α ∈ Tr(JpsK)
Lemma 5 (No trace is added by compilation). α ∈
Tr(ps) ⇐= α ∈ Tr(JpsK)
Lemma 4 follows directly from compiler (forward) simula-
tion, which is needed to prove the compiler correct anyhow.
Hence, this lemma does not add additional proof effort. On the
other hand, Lemma 5 is an additional (and the last remaining!)
proof burden. The “difficulty” of this proof really depends on
the complexity of the traces, i.e., the complexity of interaction
between a program and its context.
C. The Why and What of TrICL
In prior work that uses trace-based back-translation, pro-
gram modules cannot share memory or the shared memory
is fixed upfront [26, 27, 21]. Traces are easy to define
in this setting. In our PAC setting, however, the memory
shared between modules can grow dynamically as the program
shares more of its previously private memory with the context
by passing it corresponding capabilities (or pointers in the
source). The context can also pass capabilities back to the
program but it should only pass back those capabilities that
it started with or those that it received previously during
the execution (since capabilities cannot be forged by design).
Consequently, any trace on which the context passes back
a capability that it didn’t receive earlier should be removed
from consideration as invalid. However, this notion of trace
(in)validity is not straightforward (in either language) because
capabilities can be passed not just directly via function argu-
ments, but also indirectly, as something that’s reachable in the
4Although Lemma 1 mentions the compiler (i.e., appears to also bridge the
two languages), we found that its proof does not rely on a cross-language
simulation, which is what we really mean by bridging the two languages.
heap at the point of a transition. This makes valid traces on
partial programs rather hard to define. To avoid this problem,
we use a different definition of traces.
A new definition of traces: We start from whole programs,
not partial programs. The trace is defined by decorating the
small-step semantics of the whole program with information
about interaction between its modules. We then define the
traces of a partial program as the traces it can produce when
linked with some (existentially quantified) context. The explicit
presence of the context automatically ensures that all traces
are valid, so we don’t have to define validity separately. (In
other words, validity of a trace now follows implicitly from
easier-to-define invariants on the whole execution state.)
Definition 3 (Traces of a partial program).
Tr(p)
def
= {α | ∃C, s, ς. (init(C[p]), ∅)⇀α− p (s, ς)}
∅ and ς in this definition are auxiliary state components,
that we describe in Section V. The reader can ignore them
for now. ⇀α− p represents label-decorated whole-program reduc-
tion, which we also define in Section V. To prove Lemma 5
with this definition of traces, we must show that, given a trace
α of JpsK, there is an emulating source context Cemu such that
Cemu[ps] produces α. In other words, we must back-translate
a trace α into a source context Cemu and show that Cemu[ps]
can actually produce α. For this, we would like to set up a
simulation between the target and source runs. However, this
simulation can be very hard to set up because we constructed
the emulating source context without considering the given
target context (just from the trace prefix) and, hence, there can
be differences between the internal behaviors of the emulating
context and the given target context, e.g., in the specific order
of updates to the shared memory, and in the internal function
calls. These differences mean that the memory (and the call
stack) do not remain in sync between the emulating source
context and the given target context and our simulation relation
needs to accommodate the big gap between the internal states
of the target contexts and the emulating source contexts. We
call this the “vertical gap”.
TrICL: This is where our new TrICL technique comes
in. TrICL introduces a third “mediator” run to the simulation,
namely, that induced by the compilation of the whole source
program containing both ps and Cemu. Overall, the three runs
are (i) the given (target) run of C[JpsK], where C is the target
context that induces the trace α, (ii) the emulating source run
of Cemu[ps], and (iii) the mediating target run of JCemu[ps]K.
Introducing the mediator run simplifies the proof as follows.
Because the mediator JCemu[ps]K is obtained by a whole
program compilation of the emulator Cemu[ps], we can reuse
whole-program compiler correctness as a black box to im-
mediately reduce the problem of showing that the emulating
(source) run emulates the given (target) run to that of showing
that the mediating (target) run emulates the given (target)
run. This reduced problem is now about two runs in the
same language (target), which enables us to write a big part
of our simulation invariants as same-language (instead of
1 Module id: Main













15 read_secret() { ... }
16 encrypt() { ... }
17 decrypt() { ... }
Listing III.1: ImpMod module.
cross-language) invariants. In other words, this simplifies the
“vertical gap”.
Section V explains the TrICL simulation for our PAC
compiler, but we note that the idea is general and should apply
to other settings as well.
III. SOURCE AND TARGET LANGUAGES
Next, we introduce our source and target languages,
ImpMod (Section III-A) and CHERIExp (Section III-B).
A. ImpMod: The source language
To keep our focus limited to the “pointers as capabil-
ities” aspect of the translation, we design ImpMod and
CHERIExp to be pretty close except in how they deal with
memory. For example, ImpMod features only unstructured
control flow in the form of a JumpIfZero instruction. But it
still has functions and modules. In fact, modules are crucial.
They are units of memory isolation, which makes programs
interesting for security. Briefly, 1) every module gets its own
module-global variables; every function inside the module can
access these variables, whereas any function external to the
module cannot access these variables directly by default, and
2) every module gets its own data stack on which it stores the
frames of live (ongoing) calls to its functions.
For example, Listing III.1, shows a module (Main) with two
module-global variables, iobuffer and secret (lines 4 & 5). The
main function5 and the secret-handling functions read_secret,
encrypt and decrypt are defined in the same module, and
thus can access the variables iobuffer and secret. The func-
tion send_rcv, in contrast, is external: it is defined in the
Networking module which is presumably untrusted. On line 11,
the Networking module gains access to iobuffer. The Networking
module, however, does not gain access to secret through
&iobuffer—so long as the other trusted functions read_secret
and encrypt also make sure to not copy (pointers to) secret
into the iobuffer. Any attempt to increment and access the
pointer &iobuffer beyond the array bounds gets stuck. To
understand how we model these bounds checks, we introduce
the expression semantics and the memory model of ImpMod.
5Notice in the main function on line 8 the use of variable iobuffer; the
syntax for l-values is more explicit than in C.
1) Expressions and memory model of ImpMod: Expres-
sions are denoted e and do not update memory.
e ::= Z | VarID | e⊕ e | e[e] | &VarID | &e[e] | ∗(e) | start(e)
| end(e) | offset(e) | capType(e) | limRange(e, e, e)
V ::= Z | Cap
Base expressions are integers Z and variable identifiers VarID
(both local and global). Binary arithmetic expressions are
generically denoted e⊕ e. Pointer and array expressions are:
1) the array-offset expression e[e], 2) the ampersand (ad-
dress-of) operator of the forms &VarID and &e[e], and 3) the
star (pointer dereference) operator ∗(e). The intuitive meanings
of these expressions are as in C. Moreover, there are low-level
expressions that are necessary for reflecting the target memory
model in the source language (as mentioned in Section I):
four getters: start(e), end(e), offset(e), and capType(e); and
a setter: limRange(e, e, e). These low-level expressions operate
on a capability-based representation of memory addresses that
we explain next.
Addresses in ImpMod are represented as capabilities. Thus,
built into the memory model is a type Cap for capabilities
that is distinct from integers Z. Hence, run-time values V
are integers Z or capabilities Cap. A memory Mem : Z fin−⇀ V
is a finite map from addresses to values. Note that the
range of a memory may contain capability values. Con-
cretely, we define the type Cap of capability values as
Cap
def
= {κ, δ} × Z× Z× Z. The first field of the capability
value indicates its type: code (κ) or data (δ). The getter of this
field is the expression capType. The next three (integer) fields
are respectively the start, end, and offset of the capability.
The start and end identify the memory region on which this
capability authorizes a code (κ) or data (δ) access operation.
The offset designates the address at which an access operation
is performed. The offset should be within range (checked by
Rule Eval-star below).
The semantics of expressions are defined in Figure 1 by
the judgment e ⇓ v. Notice that expressions in ImpMod do
not have side effects. The evaluation context for expressions
consists of:
1) syntactic information about the program given by the
function definitions Fd, the declarations of module-global
variables MVar, and the layout and bounds β of all the
program’s variables;
2) load-time information about the program given by the
per-module data-segment-location ∆, and the per-module
local-stack-location Σ; and
3) execution-state information given by the memory Mem,
the stack pointers Φ of the module-local stacks and the
program counter pc.
We make two observations on the rules of Figure 1. First,
Rules Eval-amp-local-var and Eval-amp-module-var are the
only two rules (of expression evaluation) where a capability
value originates. In fact, this capability value originates out of
thin air. This behavior (the minting of a capability value during
the course of the program execution) is precisely why this
source semantics is not really executable as is on a capability
architecture. On a capability architecture, a program does not
have any means to forge a capability value. Instead, it can
only refer to capability registers6. (Contrast these two rules to
Rules Eval-ddc and Eval-stc of Section III-B.) Replacing the
mentions of program variables with expressions that mention
capability registers is thus the key role of a PAC compiler.
Second, Rule Eval-star performs a bounds check before it
loads a value from memory. Building-in this check is how
we define ImpMod to be spatially safe by relying on the
capability-based memory model. A similar bounds check is
performed at store time as well (see the rule for the Assign
command in the TR).
2) Commands and execution state of ImpMod: Commands
of ImpMod are denoted Cmd. Unlike expressions, they can
modify memory and other parts of the execution state.
Cmd ::= Assign el er | Alloc el esize | Call fid e | Return |
JumpIfZero ec eoff | Exit
The commands should be self-explanatory (fid is a function
name). An execution state s def= 〈Mem,Φ, pc, stk, nalloc〉 of a
program in ImpMod consists of the memory Mem, the stack
pointers Φ of the module-local stacks, the program counter
pc, a trusted control stack stk—which is shared among all
modules of a program—and the memory-allocation status
represented by the next-free-address nalloc. The space for
dynamic memory allocation (i.e., the heap) is also shared by
all the program modules (like the trusted control stack). The
purpose of modeling a control stack that is trusted and hence
separate from the accessible memory is that we want to rule
out all ill-formed control sequences. No command in ImpMod
can write directly to this control stack.
The semantics are small step and use the judgment
→ ⊆ s× s that is indexed with an evaluation context
Fd,MVar, β,∆,Σ and an allocation limit ∇. The allocation
limit (∇) is the maximum possible size of the shared heap.
See the TR for details of the semantics.
B. CHERIExp: The target language
Our target language CHERIExp is, like ImpMod, an im-
perative language with modules. However, unlike ImpMod, it
does not feature variables. Instead, it only features “capability
registers” and integers as base expressions. The role of the
compiler from ImpMod to CHERIExp is to implement
operations on source pointers by using operations on capability
registers. The memory model is like that of ImpMod (Sec-
tion III-A1), i.e., it is capability based. Through this capability-
based memory model and capability registers, CHERIExp
models a slightly abstracted and simplified version of CHERI
assembly [5].
6It can also get capabilities by calling the memory allocator, which in
turn will place in a register (or in the program’s memory) a new capability
authorizing access to the allocated region.
1) Expressions and commands in CHERIExp:
e ::= Z | getddc | getstc | e⊕ e | inc(e, e) | deref(e)
| start(e) | end(e) | offset(e) | capType(e)
| limRange(e, e, e)
Expressions are denoted e. The language has three named
capability registers: stc, ddc and pcc. The names of these
registers hint at their recommended usage: ddc stands for
default data capability while stc stands for stack capability.
Our compiler uses ddc as a capability on the per-module data
segment, and stc on the per-module stack. The third capability
register, pcc, holds the program counter capability which
points to the current command and allows the execution of
commands. The expressions getddc and getstc immediately
return the current value of the respective capability registers,
ddc and stc. (See rule Eval-ddc in Figure 2.) However, pcc
cannot be read in CHERIExp. This is a simple way of
enforcing the restriction (mentioned in Section I) on linking
with contexts that mention the pcc register. No expression
allows the fabrication of an arbitrary capability, thus enforcing
capability unforgeability.
In CHERIExp, one can increment (decrement) the offset
of a capability by an arbitrary integer value (see rule Eval-inc),
resulting in a new capability that nevertheless has the same
bounds as the original. The check that the offset lies within
bounds is only performed at use time (e.g., use by means of a
deref expression). Observe that rule Eval-deref performs the
same bounds-check on the capability value that rule Eval-star
(of ImpMod) performs. limRange(e1, e2, e3) restricts the
lower- and upper-bounds of the capability e1 to the interval
[e2, e3), returning a new capability.
Commands in CHERIExp are the same as commands in
ImpMod (modulo expressions). Briefly, the small-step com-
mand reduction is denoted with→ ⊆ s× s where a state s of
a CHERIExp program, as in ImpMod, consists of a memory
Mem, an allocation status nalloc and a trusted stack stk,
but, unlike ImpMod, additionally consists of three capability
registers: ddc, stc and pcc, and a map mstc holding a per-
module capability authorizing access to the module’s local
data stack (the local data stack is part of the memory Mem).
Note that we model both a trusted stack (and hence a
secure calling convention), and a separate map for the per-
module data-stack capability in CHERIExp. This built-in
segregation may sound too abstract for a target language
that has low-level elements like capability registers. However,
this modeling choice allows us to focus only on the PAC
principle for program variables without worrying about the
integrity of the stack pointer. (Prior work has already shown
how compilers can enforce well-bracketed control flow and
stack encapsulation using capabilities [16].)
IV. OUR PAC COMPILER
Our ImpMod to CHERIExp compiler (J·K) translates
pointers to capabilities (the PAC principle). In this section,
we present its crucial bits, namely, the translation of ImpMod
(Eval-amp-local-var)
(fid, _) = pc vid ∈ localIDs (Fd(fid)) ∪ args (Fd(fid)) mid = moduleID (Fd(fid))
β(vid, fid,mid) = [st, end) φ = Σ(mid).1 + Φ(mid)
&vid ⇓ (δ, φ+ st, φ+ end, 0)
(Eval-amp-module-var)
(fid, _) = pc vid /∈ localIDs (Fd(fid)) ∪ args (Fd(fid)) mid = moduleID (Fd(fid))
vid ∈ MVar(mid) β(vid,⊥,mid) = [st, end)
&vid ⇓ (δ,∆(mid).1 + st,∆(mid).1 + end, 0)
(Eval-amp-arr)
&earr ⇓ (δ, st, end, off) eidx ⇓ off ′ off ′ ∈ Z
&earr[eidx] ⇓ (δ, st, end, off + off ′)
(Eval-star)
e ⇓ (δ, st, end, off) st ≤ st + off < end
∗(e) ⇓ Mem(st + off)
Fig. 1: (Excerpt) Evaluation of expressions in ImpMod. The evaluation relation ⇓ is indexed with an evaluation context
Fd,MVar, β,∆,Σ,Mem,Φ, pc, which we elide for brevity.
(Eval-ddc)
Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ` getddc ⇓ ddc
(Eval-stc)
Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ` getstc ⇓ stc
(Eval-inc)
Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ` e ⇓ (x, st, end,off) Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ` ez ⇓ vz vz ∈ Z
Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ` inc(e, ez) ⇓ (x, st, end,off + vz)
(Eval-deref)
Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ` e ⇓ (δ, st, end,off) st ≤ st + off < end
Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ` deref(e) ⇓Mem(st + off)
(Eval-limRange)
Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ` e1 ⇓ (x, st, end,off) Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ` e2 ⇓ st′
Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ` e3 ⇓ end′ st′ ∈ Z end′ ∈ Z [st′, end′) ⊆ [st, end)
Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ` limRange(e1, e2, e3) ⇓ (x, st′, end′,0)
Fig. 2: (Excerpt) Evaluation of expressions in CHERIExp.
expressions to CHERIExp expressions. The translations of
commands (denoted L·M) and of modules (J·K) are rather trivial
due to the similarity of the syntax of the source and target
commands and modules, so we elide those.
The translation of expressions *·+ : e → e, whose excerpts
are presented below, is indexed by the syntactic information
fid,modID (function id and module id) providing the scope of
the expression being translated, and β, giving the layout and




*e1 ⊕ e2+ fid,modID,β
def






when β(vid,⊥,modID) = (st, end)
*&vid+ fid,modID,β
def
= let s = getstc in
let so = start(s) + offset(s) in
limRange(s, st + so, end + so)
when β(vid, fid,modID) = (st, end)
*vid+ fid,mid,β
def
= deref( * &vid +fid,mid,β )
*&earr[eoff ]+ fid,mid,β
def
= inc( * &earr+ fid,mid,β , *eoff + fid,mid,β )
*earr[eoff ]+ fid,mid,β
def
= deref( * &earr[eoff ] + fid,mid,β )
Translating expressions start, end, offset, capType, and
limRange is straightforward and is similar to *e1 ⊕ e2+. As an
example, we show the translation of Line 11 of Listing III.1.
LCall send_rcv(&iobuffer)M
= Call send_rcv (limRange(
ddc, start(ddc) + 0, start(ddc) + 512))
Note that the compiler uses the bounds information that is
given in the text of the program in the declaration of the array
(Line 4) to introduce explicit curbing (using limRange) of
the ddc capability so that the resulting capability is of the
same size as the declared array size (512) and not bigger. This
curbing prevents the external function send_rcv from offsetting
the capability beyond the span of iobuffer and from accessing
other variables like secret. This curbing is, in fact, essential
for full abstraction since a similar out-of-bounds access is
prohibited in the source semantics.
V. PROVING THE COMPILER FULLY ABSTRACT
We prove our compiler fully abstract following the steps
in Section II. We fill in details of two of the steps here: The
definition of traces and the proof of Lemma 5 using TrICL.
(Return-to-program)
s→ s′ s.Mc(s.pcc) = Return
s.pcc * dom (p.Mc) s′.pcc ⊆ dom (p.Mc)




ret? Memshr, s.nalloc−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−⇀p (s′, ς ′)
Fig. 3: Trace semantics of CHERIExp (Excerpt). The trace-
step relation is indexed with a program p.
A. Traces
As explained in Section II, we define traces by augmenting
the small-step semantics of whole programs (Section III) with
labels that capture information about the interaction between
the program p of interest and its context. In our two languages,
such an interaction happens only through shared memory or
function arguments in only those steps that transfer control
from the program to the context or vice-versa. Accordingly, a
trace label arises only at such border-crossing control transfer
steps, and the label records the shared memory, and the
function arguments as in Laird [28]. In the following, we give
a formal account of this development for the target language
CHERIExp; the account for the source language ImpMod
is similar.
The labeled trace-step relation for CHERIExp is written
λ−⇀p. The relation relates two trace states and a label λ. A trace
state (s, ς) extends the normal execution state s with auxiliary
information ς , which is the set of memory addresses shared
so far (i.e., from the initial state and up until execution state
s) between the program of interest p and the context. This
auxiliary information is used to define an informative trace
label λ. A trace α is a finite list λ of labels λ. Trace labels λ
(of both our languages) have the following forms:
λ ::= τ | X | ret ? Mem,nalloc | ret ! Mem,nalloc |
call(fid) v ? Mem,nalloc | call(fid) v ! Mem,nalloc
- A silent label τ abstracts over any execution step that is
internal to either the program p or the context.
- A termination label X indicates that a terminal execution
state was reached. (Once a X appears, it re-appears in all
subsequent trace labels.)
- An input call label call(fid) v ? Mem,nalloc indicates that
at an execution state where the shared memory was Mem , and
the memory allocator state was nalloc, the context called the
program’s function fid with the list of values v as arguments.
- An output call label call(fid) v ! Mem,nalloc is similar to
an input call label but the call goes in the opposite direction:
the program called the context’s function fid .
- An input return label ret ? Mem,nalloc indicates that at an
execution state where the shared memory was Mem , and the
allocator state was nalloc, the context returned to the program.
- An output return label ret ! Mem,nalloc is similar except
that the program returned control to the context.
Figure 3 shows the input return rule of λ−⇀p. The third and
fourth premises check that the program counter capability pcc
belongs to p’s code memory after the transition but not before,
implying that this is a border crossing from the context into
the program of interest p. Similar checks exist in other rules
(shown in the TR).
Next, given a reduction sequence of labeled steps, we drop
all τ labels from it, and concatenate the non-τ labels into a
trace α, writing (s, ς) ⇀α− p (s′, ς ′) for the resulting steps.7
Then, we define the traces of a partial program p as in
Definition 3. We note that all traces are alternating in “?”
and “!”.
Fact 1 (Traces are alternating). α ∈ Tr(p) =⇒ α ∈ AltX∗










? is the set of ?-
decorated labels, and similarly for
•
!.
B. Proof of Lemma 5 using TrICL
Lemma 5 assumes a trace α for JpsK (in some target
context, say, C) and requires constructing a source emulating
context Cemu such that Cemu[ps] also has α. For this, we
back-translate α to a source context. We illustrate the back-
translation through an example. Figure 4 shows one trace that
is emitted by the compiled version of the module Main of
Listing III.1.
The compilation of the first three commands generate τ
steps, which are dropped from traces. The next two non-τ
labels (shown in the example) are interesting:
1) the function call send_rcv(&iobuffer) on Line 11 is
border crossing, so its compilation emits an output call
label which contains the callee function id (send_rcv ),
the argument to the call (the δ-capability representing
the translation of the pointer &iobuffer), the direction
of the call (! denoting output, i.e., program-to-context),
a snapshot of the memory shared so far (namely, the
contents of the array iobuffer), and the value −1 denoting
the first heap address (the heap grows towards negative
addresses in our semantics).
2) the target context (in which our compiled program ex-
ecutes) returns control to the compiled program, in this
case, after zeroing out the contents of the shared memory.
This emits an input return label.
Lemma 5 requires showing that exactly the same trace can
be emitted by the source program in some source context. The
proof of Lemma 5, therefore, requires us to construct such
a source context, which we call the emulating context. The
emulating context depends on the trace.8 Listing V.1 shows
an emulating context for our example trace.
1 Module id: Networking








7These technicalities, all worked out in our TR, are mostly inspired by
process calculi [29].
8In principle, it could also depend on the target context, but this is usually











[σ 7→ 0, . . . , σ + 42 7→ 0, . . . , σ + 511 7→ 0],
︷︸︸︷
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21 snapshot_0_σ + 511;
22
23 mimicMemory_1() {
24 Assign ∗(arg_store_0_send_rcv_0[0]) 0;
25 ...




Listing V.1: Example back-translation (simplified excerpt): An
ImpMod context emulating the trace of Figure 4.
This emulating source context consists of two modules,
Networking, which implements the API function send_rcv,
and HelperBackTranslation, which implements helper func-
tions and maintains metadata. We show just one exam-
ple of such a helper function, namely mimicMemory_1().
mimicMemory_1() is called (on Line 11) by send_rcv(). It
zeroes out the IO buffer (to mimic the shared memory in
the second action of the given target trace). The IO buffer
is accessed by mimicMemory_1() through the pointer stored
in the global variable arg_store_0_send_rcv_0 (Line 18).
This pointer is stored (not shown) by the function call
saveArgs_send_rcv_1(iob_ptr) on Line 8.
We briefly explain what each helper function does. First,
the context emulating a given trace defines a different set of
helper functions for every position on the trace. The index
of the corresponding trace label appears in the identifier
of a helper function (for example, mimicMemory_1(), and
saveSnapshot_0()). To explain the helper functions, we follow
the body of send_rcv(iob_ptr) line by line. In the beginning,
the call to readAndIncrementTraceIdx keeps track of the
current position in the trace. This knowledge of the current
position in the trace is not used in our toy example, but it
would be used if the API function (send_rcv in this case)
were called at more than one position in the given trace;
at each such position, we would use this knowledge to call
the corresponding helper functions (e.g., mimicMemory_3()
instead of mimicMemory_1(), which would copy to the shared
memory the values that appear in trace position 3 instead of 1).
Next, on Line 8, we store the pointer iob_ptr in a global
variable by calling the HelperBackTranslation module because
we may need it to simulate a future trace position, not just the
current call to send_rcv. For the same reason, we save (on
Line 9) a snapshot of the whole shared memory in global
variables snapshot_0_σ to snapshot_0_σ + 511.
Next, on Lines 10 to 12, the actual emulation of the
trace action at trace position 1 is done. In our example,
doAllocations_1() would do nothing because nalloc in Fig-
ure 4 does not change. Importantly, mimicMemory_1() writes
all the values (the zeros) to the shared memory before send_rcv
eventually returns, thus mimicking the given target trace.
The difficult simulation: Returning back to the general
picture of Lemma 5, after we have constructed the emulating
source context from the given trace α, we must prove that
the source program and this context emulate the given target
trace. As explained in Section II, for this, we would like
to set up a simulation between the target and source runs,
but this simulation can be very hard because there can be
differences between the internal behaviors of the emulating
context and the given target context, e.g., in the specific order
of updates to the shared memory, and in the internal function
calls. Indeed, the target context likely does not use the kind
of helper functions our emulating source context does! Our
simulation needs to accommodate this “vertical gap”.
To add to this difficulty, we do want to simulate through (the
!-decorated) execution steps of the program of interest (ps in
Lemma 5). And since our compiler compiles it, this simulation
would be very similar to what we would have to do anyhow
just to prove our compiler correct, not fully abstract. So, we
would like to “reuse” this part.
TrICL to the rescue: This is where our new TrICL sim-
ulation comes in. TrICL introduces a third “mediator” run to
the simulation, namely, that induced by the compilation of the
whole source program JCemu[ps]K, containing both ps and our
emulating context, say, Cemu. As explained in Section II, this
simplifies the proof because we can “reuse” whole-program
compiler correctness as a black box to immediately reduce
the problem of showing that the emulating run emulates the
given run to that of showing that the mediating run emulates
the given run. The emulating and mediating runs are in the
same language, so this reduces the “vertical gap”.
Finally, to show that the mediating run emulates the given
run in the target language, we rely on an alternating simulation
in the target language that uses two different relations between
the two runs – a strong relation ≈JpsK, which holds while
the compilation of the program of interest executes, and a
weak relation ∼JpsK, which holds while the contexts C (which
produced α) and JCemuK execute. The need for two relations
will become clear shortly.
TrICL formally: Formally, TrICL is a relation between
three trace states (a source emulating state semu, a target
mediating state smed and a target given state sgiven of the
three runs explained above) that agree on the memory shared
between the context and the program of interest. TrICL is
indexed by a trace α that we are trying to emulate and a
position i of that trace. The relation requires that (1) semu and
smed are related by the whole-program compiler correctness
relation (∼=ps ), (2) the source state satisfies an emulation in-
variant, which basically captures that the construction of Cemu
is indeed an emulation of the input steps of the trace α, e.g.,
that the functions mimicMemory_1() and doAllocations_1()
indeed emulate the input trace action α(1), and (3) the two
target states smed and sgiven are related by the strong relation
≈JpsK when execution is in JpsK and by the weak relation ∼JpsK
when execution is in the contexts.
Definition 4 (Trace-Indexed Cross-Language (TrICL) alter-
nating simulation relation).
TrICL (semu, smed, sgiven, ς)α,i,ps
def
=
semu ∼=ps smed ∧ emulate_invariants (semu)α,i,ps
∧ (α(i) ∈
•
! =⇒ (smed, ς) ≈JpsK (sgiven, ς))
∧ (α(i) ∈
•
? =⇒ (smed, ς) ∼JpsK (sgiven, ς))
Given this definition, we come to the key step of our proof,
namely, that TrICL is an invariant.
Lemma 6 (TrICL step-wise alternating backward-simulation).
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Before sketching the proof of this key lemma, we explain
how the proof reuses the backward- and forward- simulation
lemmas that are anyhow needed for compiler correctness:
• When control is in the contexts (case α(i) ∈
•
? of
Definition 4), we know by the emulation invariant that
the source context Cemu emulates the next action of the
trace α (the emulation invariant holds of the construction
shown in the example earlier), and we use forward
simulation to argue that the mediating context, which is
just the compilation of this source context, does the same.
• Dually, when control is in the program of interest (case
α(i) ∈
•
! of Definition 4), we know by the precondition
of Lemma 6 that JpsK produces the next action of the

















Fig. 5: Alternating strong and weak relations between the
‘mediator’ execution (top) and the ‘given’ execution (bottom).
below) JpsK also produces the same action in the mediator
trace. But now from knowing that an action of the medi-
ator trace was produced, we use backward simulation to
reason that the source program ps does the same action.
This “reuse” of the (forward- and backward-) simulations that
are anyhow needed for compiler correctness is the simplifica-
tion that TrICL affords. The proof of the two interesting cases
of Lemma 6 is given in Appendix A.9
The strong and weak relations: We now explain the
strong relation ≈JpsK and the weak relation ∼JpsK between
the target trace states of the mediating run (of JCemu[ps]K)
and the given run (of C[JpsK]). Following Definition 4, the
strong relation holds between trace states while control is in
the compilation of the program of interest JpsK in the two runs.
Since this program (part) is exactly the same in both runs, the
strong relation is a lock-step simulation (Lemma 9), which
maintains similarity of the call stacks, the private memory
of the program of interest and the shared memory (memory
accessible to both the context and the program of interest).
In contrast, the weak relation holds between trace states
while control is in the contexts JCemuK and C. Since these
two contexts can be very different, this relation is not lock-
step. It allows one step on either side to be simulated by zero
or more steps on the other side (Lemma 11) and allows a
different sequence of internal function calls (and, hence, stack
states). In terms of memory, it only enforces that the private
memory of the program of interest remain in sync, but the
shared memory and the private memory of the contexts may
diverge arbitrarily.
In the proof of Lemma 6, these relations must be replaced
by each other at border crossings. At a border crossing where
control transfers from the program of interest to the contexts
(case α(i) ∈
•
!), we must “weaken” the strong relation to
the weak one. This is quite straightforward since the strong
relation directly implies the weak relation.
In the other direction, at a border crossing where control
transfers from the contexts to the program of interest (case
α(i) ∈
•
?), we must “strengthen” the weak relation to the
strong relation. For this, we must prove that the shared memory
9The proof relies on forward- and backward-simulation, and also on key
properties of the strong and weak similarities and of the emulate invariants.
All of these properties (Lemmas 7 to 14) are given in Appendix A, and are
proved in the TR.
(recorded on α(i)) is exactly the same in the two target runs at
that point. This is not obvious and is proved as follows. First,
we know from the TrICL invariants that the third trace (the
emulating source trace) is mimicking the step α(i). We then
use this conclusion to show that the trace label α(i) at the
border crossing in question must be the same in the given
and the mediator runs (the two target runs). Here is how:
By applying compiler-correctness forward simulation to the
emulating run so far, we conclude that the mediating trace
must also take a step with the same label α(i). Since the
shared memory is recorded in the label α(i), it immediately
follows that the shared memory is exactly the same in the three
runs, and in particular in the two target runs, which completes
the strengthening proof.
Figure 5 depicts the alternating nature of the strong and
weak relations, and the strengthening and weakening at border
crossings. The two traces are depicted as two horizontal
sequences of states/transitions. The black lines that connect
states from opposite traces show the nature of the simulation
condition: option simulation (Lemma 11) is possible for weak
similarity (the single black line), while for strong similarity
(the double black line), only lock-step simulation (Lemma 9)
is possible.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION IN A COMPILER FROM C TO CHERI
We have implemented the key ideas of Section IV in a com-
piler from C to CHERI . CHERI comes with a Clang/LLVM
compiler [10] that already implements PAC , but no isolation
for modules, which ImpMod has. Our compiler enforces this
isolation via a C-to-C source pre-processing transform. The
compiler relies on libcheri, CheriBSD’s library for building,
invoking and loading sandboxes – isolated units of computa-
tion with their own code and memory, which is private until
explicitly shared. libcheri relies on CHERI ’s underlying
support for object capabilities to provide sandboxes [30].
The important thing from our perspective is that libcheri
requires the programmer to manually group functions into
classes (the equivalent of modules), and to annotate functions
to make them use object capabilities instead of the standard
calling conventions (attribute cheri_ccall) and to specifically
annotate functions that are exported from a class (attribute
cheri_ccallee). Additionally, all initialization functions must
be added to classes that call external functions.
Our source-to-source transform automates all this: It maps
C modules (compilation units) to libcheri’s sandboxes to
isolate them from each other and automatically inserts all
the required annotations. Examples of programs output by
our transform are shown in the TR. To initialize sandboxes,
we had to make some significant changes to libcheri as
well. Briefly, libcheri requires a second phase of runtime
linking to resolve cross-sandbox references. We implement
this through a new recursive initialization function, called once
before main, which loads and initializes all sandboxes that main
depends on transitively, creates relevant object capabilities, and
links the modules.
Software zlib LibYAML GNU-barcode libpng
Porting overhead summary
Lines of code 11255 12762 4657 33029
Altered lines 130 114 164 51
Percentage 1.15% 0.89% 3.5% 0.15%
No. of occurrences of each incompatible pattern
Passed local ref 2 15 0 13
Extern global var 3 0 0 0
Pointer to ext fun 2 1 26 2
Other 0 1 1 4
Total 7 17 27 19
TABLE I: Porting overheads
Differences from the formalization: Our idealized source
language ImpMod provides accessors for bounds information
about pointers whereas native C, that our implementation
supports, does not. CHERI ’s C interface, however, provides
pointers with such accessors. (These pointers wrap CHERI
capabilities.) We rely on the programmer to use these CHERI
pointers in place of native C pointers consistently. We have
also not yet implemented the (straightforward) link-time check
on target contexts to prevent them from accessing pcc di-
rectly, something that our ideal target language CHERIExp
enforces.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluate the overheads of our proof-of-concept isolation
scheme using four large open-source C libraries that we chose
carefully for heterogeneity and compiled with our compiler:
zlib [31], LibYAML [32], GNU-barcode [33], and libpng [34].
Code changes: We had to make some manual code
changes to address incompatibilities between our scheme and
the existing toolchain. These incompatibilities are: (a) Moving
local variables whose addresses are shared with other modules
to the heap; this is a fundamental limitation of CHERI ,
not specific to our scheme. (b) Explicitly sharing pointers to
exported global variables of a module; this can be automated
with further work on the CHERI linker. (c) In the existing
toolchain, a function pointer always compiles to an execute
capability. Our isolating scheme requires object capabilities
for cross-module calls. To compensate for this incompatibility,
we had to make manual changes to cross-module calls using
function pointers. Table I summarizes the magnitude of our
changes on the various benchmarks. Overall, the changes are
quite limited.
Performance overheads: The most significant perfor-
mance overhead in our scheme comes from cross-module
function calls, where we use the CHERI ccall instruction,
which is used to implement object capabilities. This instruction
is expensive as it performs a number of operations like
saving and restoring callee-save registers, clearing unused
argument registers and making certain checks on arguments.10
10Some of this overhead is not fundamental and the CHERI design has
improved on ccall over time [9]. The overhead reported here is based on
ccall as it exists in CHERI ISA version 5, and should be considered
conservative.
(a) zlib











































Fig. 6: Performance benchmark results. Note that x-axes are log-scale.
The number of cross-module calls is, of course, application
dependent. To isolate this overhead, we compare the execution
times of calls to library functions compiled with our scheme
to those compiled with the vanilla CHERI compiler, which
offers no module isolation and, hence, no security. We perform
our experiments on a single-core CHERI VM implementing
CHERI ISA version 5 [35] running our modified version of
CheriBSD. This VM was hosted in another VirtualBox [36]
VM with FreeBSD 9.1, which, in turn, runs on an arch-Linux
host. The physical machine has a 4 core Intel Core i7-6700
CPU with 16 GB of RAM, of which 512 MB are allocated to
the CHERI VM.
Figure 6 summarizes our results. The y-axes are execu-
tion times. The x-axes are log-scale. The lines “secure” and
“vanilla” correspond to our scheme and vanilla CHERI ,
respectively. All times are averages of 10 runs. Standard
deviations were all below 0.3s with the exception of the two
longest LibYAML experiments, where they were 1.5s in each
case. A small, constant delay of about 0.2s associated with
the sandbox loading routines is included in both the baseline
and the secure versions. We do not show the benchmark
GNU-barcode as it takes very small inputs only.
Our overhead relative to vanilla CHERI is negligible for
zlib as this benchmark has very few cross-module calls (43–
441 as the payload size varies). In LibYAML, the number of
cross-module calls grows linearly with input size, so the ratio
of the two lines is nearly constant (our relative overhead is
consistently between 35 and 40%). In libpng, the number of
cross-module calls is constant but large (approx. 125,000), so
the difference between the two lines is nearly constant and
easily perceivable. Overall, these observations are in line with
our expectation that the performance overhead of our isolation
scheme is dominated by the number of cross-module calls and
that the overhead of each such call is constant.
The absolute numbers reported here should not be extrap-
olated to other hardware as they were obtained on a CHERI
simulator that is not cycle accurate. Nonetheless, we expect
similar trends to hold, i.e, the overhead should be roughly
linear in the number of cross-module calls on all similar
hardware. Another noteworthy point is that a compiler may
choose a different isolation boundary, e.g, it could isolate
individual class objects to prevent access to their private fields
from outside. In such a case, the primary overhead would shift
to crossings of that isolation boundary. In the said example,
the overhead would become proportional to the number of
cross-object method invocations.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Verified compilation to capability machines: The work
closest to ours is StkTokens [16] as it also verifies a compiler
transformation that targets capability machines. However, Stk-
Tokens and our work are complementary: While we model and
prove secure the PAC transformation, StkTokens models and
verifies a transformation that implements a calling convention.
To do this, StkTokens assumes a hardware extension called
linear capabilities, for which experimental support exists in
CHERI . We believe that StkTokens can be combined with
our work to eliminate our trust in the control stack. Van
Strydonck et al [37] also use linear capabilities. An important
difference is that Van Strydonck et al’s compiler relies on
static contracts defining which memory is shared across trust
boundaries, while ours considers components which share
memory dynamically during execution.
Full abstraction for compiler security: The idea of using
full abstraction to formalize compiler security was intro-
duced by Abadi [20]. Compiler full abstraction (or security
in general) is typically proved either with a trace-directed
back-translation [38, 26, 27, 21] or a syntax-directed back-
translation [39, 40, 16, 37, 41, 42]. A syntax-directed back-
translation defines a reverse compiler that translates the as-
sumed distinguishing target context (a piece of syntax) to a
source context. While this approach has been used extensively
in prior work, it can be difficult to use in situations where some
target-level constructs have no obvious source counterparts.
This is not the case for our languages, but we follow the
trace-directed approach as we still find it technically simpler.
We contribute to the trace-directed technique by introducing
TrICL, which allows reuse of whole-program compiler cor-
rectness to simplify the proof of the “security direction” of full
abstraction (Definition 2((ii))). We are not aware of similar
reuse of whole-program compiler correctness in the syntax-
directed method.
Other criteria for secure compilation: A recent line of
work proposes alternate criteria for compiler security, based
on preservation of classes of properties and hyperproperties
in the presence of adversarial contexts [43, 44, 26, 45, 46].
Many of these criteria are incomparable to full abstraction,
while some are stronger. Work on proof techniques for proving
these criteria is still in early stages, but back-translation (both
trace-directed and syntax-directed) features prominently. In
particular, Abate et al. [26] describe a compiler and prove
a strong robust safety property (not FA) for it using trace-
directed back-translation. Their method also reuses whole-
program compiler correctness to reduce a big part of cross-
language reasoning to only target-level reasoning. However,
their setting does not support sharing of memory across mod-
ules, which substantially simplifies their proof by eliminating
the need for the strong and weak relations (Section V-B).
Another line of work [47, 48, 49, 50, 51] verifies that the
compiler does not undo countermeasures that the programmer
of cryptographic libraries implements in order to ensure pro-
tection against timing attacks or other secret-revealing attacks.
Fully-abstract trace semantics: Our trace labels are in-
spired by Laird’s work for a functional language with general
references [28]. Laird relies on a bipartite LTS in which
nodes are partitioned between program configurations and
environment (context) configurations. We do not use this
segregation explicitly, but our checks on pcc in the trace
semantics have the same effect.
IX. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our work shows formally that PAC compilers can provide
strong guarantees for partial programs. While we believe that
this is a significant step forward in the understanding of the
security properties of PAC compilers, we still make some
simplifications and assumptions that would be interesting to
remove in future work. First, our memory allocation model
does not support de-allocation. This simplification allows us
to represent the state of the memory allocator as just the
next-free-address, and this is essential in keeping our model
manageable. To the best of our knowledge, nobody has yet
developed fully abstract trace semantics for languages with a
realistic model of deallocation. Work in this direction would
be interesting. Second, we do not yet model side channels.
As such, our compiler is not guaranteed to preserve resistance
against side-channel leaks [52]. There is recent related work
that specifically investigates how to secure compilers such
that they preserve side-channel resistance [47, 50, 51, 48, 49].
Combining PAC with these ideas would also be interesting.
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C. Hritcu, M. Patrignani, É. Tanter, and J. Thibault,
“Trace-relating compiler correctness and secure compi-
lation,” in Proc. ESOP, 2020.
[47] G. Barthe, S. Blazy, B. Grégoire, R. Hutin, V. Laporte,
D. Pichardie, and A. Trieu, “Formal verification of a
constant-time preserving C compiler,” in Proc. POPL,
2019.
[48] G. Barthe, B. Grégoire, and V. Laporte, “Secure com-
pilation of side-channel countermeasures: The case of
cryptographic “constant-time”,” in Proc. CSF, 2018.
[49] R. Sison and T. Murray, “Verifying That a Compiler Pre-
serves Concurrent Value-Dependent Information-Flow
Security,” in Proc. ITP, 2019.
[50] F. Besson, A. Dang, and T. Jensen, “Securing compilation
against memory probing,” in Proc. PLAS, 2018.
[51] C. Watt, J. Renner, N. Popescu, S. Cauligi, and D. Stefan,
“CT-wasm: Type-driven secure cryptography for the web
ecosystem,” in Proc. POPL, 2019.
[52] V. D’Silva, M. Payer, and D. Song, “The correctness-
security gap in compiler optimization,” in IEEE Security
and Privacy Workshops (SPW), 2015.
APPENDIX
A. Some details of the proof of Lemma 6
We show some excerpted definitions of key constituents of
our TrICL relation and the proof of Lemma 6, the step-wise
backward simulation condition of TrICL, which is an interest-
ing proof because it puts together the whole-program compiler
correctness lemmas. We group the (discharged) assumptions
used in the proof of Lemma 6 (namely, Lemmas 7 to 14 below)
by the components of TrICL they refer to. We recall that
TrICL is defined in terms of four main relations/invariants:
1) the vanilla (whole-program) compiler-correctness rela-
tion (∼=p) between the source state and the mediator
state satisfying lifted forward- and backward-simulations
(Lemmas 7 and 8)
2) a strong-similarity relation (≈p) between the mediator
state and the given state, a relation that satisfies lock-step
simulation (Lemma 9)
3) a weak-similarity relation (∼p) also between the media-
tor state and the given state, a relation that satisfies option
simulation (Lemma 11), and – together with the strong
similarity – satisfying both weakening (Lemma 10) and
strengthening (Lemma 12)
4) emulation invariants about the source state satisfying
both adequacy (Lemma 13) and preservation by trace
steps (Lemma 14)
Definition 5 (Weak-similarity relation (excerpt)).
(s1, ς) ∼p (s2, ς)
def
= s1.stk ∼p s2.stk ∧ s1.mem ∼p,ς
s2.mem
where weak stack similarity and weak memory similarity are
defined as follows:
s1.stk ∼p s2.stk is defined to be the existence of a map
between the indices of the entries of s1.stk and the indices
of the entries of s2.stk, such that this map is “successor
preserving”, monotone, and every pair of indices that is in the
map corresponds to two equal stack entries (one from s1.stk
and the second from s2.stk). (See section 6.3 of the technical
report for formal definitions.)
s1.mem ∼p,ς s2.mem is defined to be equality of the con-
tents of memories s1.mem and s2.mem at all the currently-
private addresses of p, where a currently-private address of
p is any address that is so far not shared (i.e., not in the set
ς) and that is reachable from p’s statically-allocated memory.
Definition 6 (Strong-similarity relation (excerpt)).
(s1, ς) ≈p (s2, ς)
def
= s1.stk ≈p s2.stk ∧ s1.mem ≈p
s2.mem where strong stack similarity and strong memory
similarity are defined as follows:
s1.stk ≈p s2.stk is defined to be the same as weak stack
similarity, i.e., the existence of a map with the same properties
mentioned in Definition 5, but with the extra condition that
the top-most stack indices must be in the map. (This extra
condition ensures that all function calls and returns happen
in sync, hence, satisfying the lock-step simulation condition of
Lemma 9.)
s1.mem ≈p s2.mem is defined to be equality of the contents
of memories s1.mem and s2.mem at all the addresses
reachable from p’s statically-allocated memory.
Definition 7 (Emulation invariants (simplified excerpt)). The
emulation invariants for a state s and the prefix of a finite
trace α up to position i consist of invariants on the shape of
the code that is currently executing (i.e., the code starting
at address s.pc), in addition to invariants on memory s.mem
that ensure the metadata (that the back-translated context
keeps) is compatible with the information from the trace
prefix of α up to position i. The invariants on memory can
be found in the technical report in definitions 116, 117, 118,







? =⇒ ∃j. j ≤ i ∧ upcoming_commands(s,
emulate_responses_for_suffix (α, j , s.pc))
where:
upcoming_commands(s, c) ensures that starting at address
s.pc of the code memory of s, the commands c are allocated,
and
emulate_responses_for_suffix(α, j, . . .) is defined
recursively on j to be a nested switch statement:
switch(current_trace_idx) {
case j :
emulate_ith_action(α, j, . . .);
emulate_responses_for_suffix(α, j + 2, . . .)
case j + 2 :
emulate_ith_action(α, j + 2, . . .);
emulate_responses_for_suffix(α, j + 4, . . .)
. . .
case |α| − 1 :
emulate_ith_action(α, |α| − 1, . . .);
}
(See definitions 120 and 121 in the technical report for the
formal definitions.)
(Notice that the maximum depth of the nesting of the switch
statement is (|α| − j)/2, i.e., half the length of the suffix
starting at position j—the half originates from the fact that
we are only emulating every other trace label.)
(Notice also that, interestingly, most of the code generated by
emulate_responses_for_suffix is actually unreachable;
for a finite trace α, the size of the code generated is O(|α|2),
of which only O(|α|) is reachable. However, this extra code
simplifies some proofs.)
(Observe that emulate_ith_action generates the code in
the back-translation example of Listing V.1—lines 7 to 12)
Lemma 7 (Compiler forward-simulation lifted to compressed
trace steps). ss ∼=p st ∧ (ss, ς) ⇀
α− p (s′s, ς ′) =⇒
∃s′t. (st, ς) ⇀
α− JpK (s′t, ς ′) ∧ s′s ∼=p s′t
Lemma 8 (Compiler backward-simulation lifted to com-
pressed trace steps). ss ∼=p st ∧ (st, ς) ⇀
α− JpK (s′t, ς ′) =⇒
∃s′s. (ss, ς) ⇀
α− p (s′s, ς ′) ∧ s′s ∼=p s′t
Lemma 9 (Lock-step simulation of strong similarity).
(s1, ς) ≈p (s2, ς) ∧ (s1, ς)
τ−⇀p (s′1, ς) =⇒
∃s′2. (s2, ς)
τ−⇀p (s′2, ς) ∧ (s′1, ς) ≈p (s′2, ς)
Lemma 10 (Strong similarity is weakened by an output
action). λ ∈
•
! ∧ (s1, ς) ≈p (s2, ς)∧ (s1, ς)
λ−⇀p (s′1, ς ′) =⇒
∃s′2. (s2, ς)
λ−⇀p (s′2, ς ′) ∧ (s′1, ς ′) ∼p (s′2, ς ′)
Lemma 11 (Option simulation of weak similarity). (s1, ς) ∼p
(s2, ς) ∧ (s1, ς)
τ−⇀p (s′1, ς) =⇒ (s′1, ς) ∼p (s2, ς)
Lemma 12 (Weak similarity is strengthened by aligned input
actions). λ ∈
•
? ∧ (s1, ς) ∼p (s2, ς) ∧ (s1, ς)
λ−⇀p (s′1, ς ′) ∧
(s2, ς)
λ−⇀p (s′2, ς ′) =⇒ (s′1, ς ′) ≈p (s′2, ς ′)
Lemma 13 (Adequacy of emulate_invariants).
emulate_invariants (s)α,i,p ∧ α(i) ∈
•
? ∪ {X} =⇒
∃s′. (s, _) ⇀α(i)−−⇀p (s′, _)
Lemma 14 (Preservation of emulate_invariants).
emulate_invariants (s)α,i,p ∧ (s, _) ⇀
α(i)−−⇀p (s′, _) =⇒
emulate_invariants (s′)α,i+1,p
Using these lemmas, we prove Lemma 6 as follows.
Proof. (of Lemma 6; simplified)
Hypotheses (unfolding Definition 4):
1) α ∈ Alt




! =⇒ (smed, ς) ≈JpsK (sgiven, ς)
5) α(i) ∈
•
? =⇒ (smed, ς) ∼JpsK (sgiven, ς)
6) (sgiven, ς) ⇀
α(i)−−⇀JpsK (s′given, ς ′)
We consider two cases for the trace step α(i), which we
obtain by unfolding the definition of Alt in hypothesis 1 (we
ignore in this proof sketch the case of α(i) = X):
• Case α(i) ∈
•
?: (4 subgoals)
(a) Obtain s′emu where (semu, ς) ⇀
α(i)−−⇀JpsK (s′emu, ς ′) as
follows: Instantiate Lemma 13 (adequacy of the
emulation invariants) with both hypothesis 3 and
the case condition to obtain s′emu that satisfies
(semu, ς) ⇀
α(i)−−⇀JpsK (s′emu, ς ′′) for some ς ′′. Then, by
inversion of this step (and unfolding the computation
of the informative label), we know ς ′′ = ς ′.
(b) Obtain s′med where (smed, ς) ⇀
α(i)−−⇀JpsK (s′med, ς ′) and
s′emu
∼=ps s′med as follows: Instantiate Lemma 7 with
both hypothesis 2 and statement (a) from above.
(c) Obtain strong similarity (s′med, ς) ≈JpsK (s′given, ς) as
follows: First, unfold both statement (b) and hypothesis
6 to obtain respectively the two states s′′med and
s′′given just before the border crossing. Now instanti-
ate Lemma 11 (option simulation) with hypothesis 5
twice, once with s′′med for s
′
1 and once with s
′′
given
for s′1 (use symmetry of weak similarity before the
second instantiation). Now (by transitivity of weak
similarity), we know that (s′′med, ς) ∼JpsK (s′′given, ς).
Thus, instantiate Lemma 12 (strengthening) to obtain
(s′med, ς) ≈JpsK (s′given, ς).
(d) Obtain emulate_invariants (s′emu)α,i+1,ps as fol-
lows: Instantiate Lemma 14 (preservation of the emu-
lation invariants) with hypothesis 3 and statement (a)
from above.
• Case α(i) ∈
•
!: (3 subgoals)
(a) Obtain s′med where (smed, ς) ⇀
α(i)−−⇀JpsK (s′med, ς ′) and
(s′med, ς) ∼JpsK (s′given, ς) as follows: First, unfold
the definition of the given step of hypothesis 6 to
obtain star-many τ steps leading to some state s′′given
where also (s′′given, ς)
α(i)−−⇀JpsK (s′given, ς ′). Now in-
stantiate (the star version of) Lemma 9 (lock-step
simulation) with both hypothesis 4 (after applying
symmetry of strong similarity) and state s′′given (the
τ steps) to obtain some s′′med where (s
′′
given, ς) ≈JpsK
(s′′med, ς). Next, use this together with the step
(s′′given, ς)
α(i)−−⇀JpsK (s′given, ς ′), which we obtained
above, to instantiate Lemma 10 (weakening). Next, ap-
ply symmetry of weak similarity to obtain the subgoal.
(b) Obtain s′emu where (semu, ς) ⇀
α(i)−−⇀JpsK (s′emu, ς ′) and
s′emu
∼=ps s′med as follows: Instantiate Lemma 8 (back-
ward simulation) using both hypothesis 2 and the step
of smed that we obtained in the previous subgoal.
(c) Obtain emulate_invariants (s′emu)α,i+1,ps as fol-
lows: Instantiate Lemma 14 (preservation of the emu-
lation invariants) with both hypothesis 3 and the step
of semu that we obtained in the previous subgoal.
